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Judicial Professionalism in a New
Era of Judicial Selection
by Patrick Emery Longan*

I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 22, 2004, the Mercer Law Review and the Mercer Center
for Legal Ethics and Professionalism co-sponsored a Symposium on
recent developments related to the election of judges. The Symposium
was the Fifth Annual Georgia Symposium on Professionalism, the latest
in a series of programs funded by a consent order and judgment that
settled allegations of litigation misconduct involving the du Pont
Corporation several years ago.' That order awarded $2.5 million to
each of the four ABA-accredited law schools in Georgia to establish
professorial chairs devoted to ethics and professionalism, and it also
granted each law school $250,000 to endow the symposium series. The
-symposia rotate among the four law schools. Mercer's Walter F. George
School of Law held the first of these symposia in 2001 and, after
programs sponsored by Emory University, the University of Georgia, and
Georgia State University, Mercer's turn to host the symposium came
around again. The Symposium was held in cooperation with the Court
Futures Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, chaired by Ben
Studdard, Chief Judge of the State Court of Henry County, Georgia. In
2003 the Court Futures Committee began a comprehensive study of
* William Augustus Bootle Chair in Ethics and Professionalism in the Practice of Law,
Director of the Mercer Center for Legal Ethics and Professionalism, Walter F. George
School of Law, Mercer University. Washington University (A.B., 1979); University of
Sussex (M.A., 1980); University of Chicago (J.D., 1983). The Author serves as Reporter to
the State Bar of Georgia Court Futures Committee, but the views expressed in this Article
are his own and should not be attributed to the Committee, its members, or the State Bar
of Georgia. The author wishes to express his deep appreciation to Former Dean Michael
Sabbath for providing the support necessary for this Article to be written.
1. In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company-Benlate Litigation, No. 4:95-CV-36 (M.D.
Ga. Dec. 31, 1998) (Consent Order and Final Judgment on file with the Author).
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judicial selection in Georgia for the purpose of making recommendations
for any needed changes. Its work was ongoing when the Symposium was
held, and many members of the Committee attended and participated in
the discussions.
The purpose of this Article is to provide background and an introduction for the papers and proceedings that follow. The Article begins with
Part One, a background discussion of the three purposes that must guide
any discussion of judicial selection or re-selection. Those principles are
the need to ensure that judges can decide cases as free as possible of
political pressures, the need to make sure that judges are accountable
in some way for misbehavior, and the need to attract and retain people
of the highest quality to the bench. These background principles are
discussed through the stories of three judges, former Justice Penny
White of the Tennessee Supreme Court, United States District Judge
John McBryde of the Northern District of Texas, and former Chief
Justice Roy Moore of Alabama. Part Two of the Article is organized to
conform roughly to the organization of the program. It discusses the
recent cases that have changed how judicial elections are regulated and
describes the response of the Georgia Supreme Court. It then explores
a number of ways to improve judicial elections and, more drastically,
alternatives to the election of judges. The Article concludes with Part
Three, which contains some personal reflections regarding how state
judges should be selected and re-selected. My preference is a "functional" approach that employs different procedures for trial and appellate
judges because of their different roles in the system of justice.
The Mercer Law Review and the Center for Ethics and Professionalism
wish to thank Judge Hugh Lawson, whose creativity and courage in
shaping the consent order and final judgment made this Symposium,
and the others in the series, possible. The Symposium also could not
have occurred without the dedicated assistance of Judge Ben Studdard
and the other members of the Court Futures Committee of the State Bar
of Georgia. Finally, we wish to thank our speakers and all those who
attended for making the Symposium such an enjoyable and informative
occasion.
II.

PART ONE : UNDERLYING ISSUES AND THREE CAUTIONARY TALES

Judicial selection requires a balance of two competing values: judicial
accountability and judicial independence. These two values cannot truly
be reconciled, because to the extent a judge is accountable, the judge is
not independent, and to the extent the judge is independent, the judge
is not accountable. If reconciliation is not possible, then the goal is to
achieve an appropriate balance. A third value of judicial selection,
making sure that the bench is occupied by people of the highest possible
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quality, is not inconsistent with the other two values. Indeed, good
judges do not need procedures that ensure accountability in order to act
responsibly, and conversely, these judges do not need protection in order
to act independently. For these reasons, and for the simpler and more
obvious reason that good judges will make good decisions and run
efficient courts, it is important to attract and retain people of the highest
quality to the bench. Part One of this Article discusses these issues in
the context of three "cautionary tales:"
A.

Independence: Justice Penny White

Penny White, a justice on the Tennessee Supreme Court, was the
subject of a retention election in 1996.2 In June of that year, the court
decided Richard Odom's appeal from his conviction and death sentence.3
Odom was convicted of the brutal rape and stabbing death of an elderly
woman in a parking lot. He was sentenced to death after a sentencing
hearing in which the trial judge did not allow Odom to present
psychiatric testimony, even though Odom had the right to do so under
Tennessee law at the time. The Tennessee intermediate appellate court
reversed the conviction and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed that decision in an opinion that
received no publicity at the time it was rendered.4 The Odom case was
Justice White's first and, as it turned out, only death penalty case as a
member of the Tennessee Supreme Court.5
All five justices agreed that the case should be remanded for sentencing. One justice dissented from the part of the opinion that would later
prove to be most troublesome for Justice White.6 In addition to its
recognition of the problem with the expert's testimony, the court
analyzed whether the State had proved at sentencing, as an aggravating
circumstance under Tennessee law, that the "murder was especially

2. This account of the story of Penny White is drawn from the following sources: State
v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996); John D. Fabian, Note, The Paradox of Elected
Judges:Tension in the American System, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155 (2001); Stephen B.
Bright et al., Panel: Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch:Do Rising Threats to Judicial
Independence Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases?, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123
(remarks of Penny White) (1999-2000); Stephen B. Bright, Can JudicialIndependence Be
Attained in the South? Overcoming History, Elections, and MisperceptionsAbout the Role
of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 817 (1998); Stephen B. Bright, PoliticalAttacks on
the Judiciary:Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges From
Office for UnpopularDecisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308 (1997).
3. Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 18.
4. Id. at 20-27.
5. Bright, PoliticalAttacks on the Judiciary,supra note 2, at 315.
6. Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 33.
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heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical
abuse beyond that necessary to produce death."7 Despite the evidence
that the victim was stabbed multiple times and raped, the court
concluded that the evidence did not meet the statutory definition.' The
language of the court's opinion provides important context for what
followed:
The issue remains whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to
uphold a finding of the (i)(5) aggravating circumstance. We well
understand that almost all murders are "heinous, atrocious, and cruel"
to some degree, and we have no purpose to demean or minimize the
ordeal this murder victim experienced. In our view, however, rape
(penile penetration) does not ordinarily constitute "torture" or "serious
physical abuse" within the meaning of the statute. Were we to hold
otherwise, every murder committed in the perpetration of rape could
be classified as a death-eligible offense. Such a result, obviously, would
not sufficiently narrow the class of perpetrators, nor would it distinguish the "worst of the worse" for whom the ultimate penalty must be
reserved. In a similar vein, and with the same disclaimer aboveappearing, we must reject the conclusion that the three stab wounds
evidenced in this case constituted "torture" or serious physical abuse
beyond that necessary to produce death. As we consider the circumstances here, we do not intend to diminish what surely must have been
a terrifying and horror-filled experience for the victim. Most assuredly,
the murder was reprehensible in the purest sense of the word-nearly
all murders are. However, the aggravating circumstance under review
must be reserved for application only to those cases which, by
comparison or contrast, can be articulately determined to be the very
"worst of the worse." As previously stated, the defendant contends that
the evidence does not support the jury's finding that the murder was
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." We have thoroughly considered this contention and conclude that under the criteria we have
discussed the evidence in the record does not support the jury's finding
of the "heinous, atrocious, and cruel" circumstance.9
This part of the decision, however, did not preclude the prosecution from
trying to prove the presence of this aggravating circumstance on
remand."°

Justice White did not author the opinion, but she, along with three
other justices, agreed with it." As her retention election approached,

7.

8.
9.
10.
11.

TENN. CODE ANN. 39-13-204(i)(5) (1996).

Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 26-27.
Id. (citations omitted).
Bright, Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch, supra note 2, at 139.
Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 20.

20051

JUDICIAL PROFESSIONALISM

917

it became clear that this decision was going to be a political problem for
her. The Republican Party of Tennessee distributed 2500 flyers to party
12
leaders about a "Just Say No" campaign for Penny White's retention.
The Tennessee Conservative Union sent out a letter describing Mr.
Odom's case as follows:
[Seventy-eight] year-old Ethel Johnson lay dying in a pool of blood.
Stabbed in the heart, lungs, and liver, she fought back as best she
could.
Her hands were sliced to ribbons as she tried to push the knife away.
And then she was raped.
Savagely ....
But her murderer won't be getting the punishment that he deserves.
Thanks to Penny White.'"
These attacks were not fair or even accurate. The court's opinion, as
quoted above, was sensitive to the brutal nature of the crime. All the
justices agreed that a new sentencing hearing was required. Four
agreed that the evidence, as presented, did not meet the statutory
definition of heinous, atrocious, or cruel.' 4 Yet, Justice White could not
respond to the allegations about the particular case because Mr. Odom
had filed a petition for rehearing, and Justice White was bound by the
Code of Judicial Conduct 15 not to comment on a pending case.' 6 She
lost her retention election and is now on the faculty of the University of
Tennessee College of Law. 17
Political pressures like those exerted against Justice White are a
danger to impartial justice. The judge's obligation is to decide cases
according to the law, not according to the political whims of the moment.
A judge who wants to retain his seat may fear making an unpopular, but
correct, decision in a notorious case.'" If the judge succumbs to that
fear, then one party suffers an injustice and, more importantly, the rule
of law is undermined. If the judge resists the temptation to bend with
the wind, he then risks losing his seat like Justice White.

12. Bright, Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch, supra note 2, at 157.
13. Letter from John M. Davies, President of the Tennessee Conservative Union, to
Robert C. Mathews, Sr., Tennessee voter (June 1996), quoted in Bright, PoliticalAttacks
on the Judiciary,supra note 2, at 331.
14. Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23, 31.
15. TENN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004).
16. Bright, Overcoming History, supra note 2, at 848.
17. Bright, Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch, supra note 2, at 140.
18. The web site of the American Judicature Society contains a list of judges who have
been subjected to severe criticism for decisions they have made, at http://www.ajs.org/cji/
cji_fire.asp.
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Issues of judicial independence will arise in the context of judicial reselection. Any system of re-selection, from the decision to abandon reselection in favor of life tenure to re-selecting judges in partisan political
races at short intervals, must be designed with some sensitivity to the
need for judicial independence. In an era where so many issues are
decided in courts, as well as in more political forums, and where
particular issues motivate groups to seek removal of a judge (regardless
of any other relevant factor), there needs to be some consideration for
the position the judges are placed in. They have to decide the cases;
they are obligated to apply the law whether it will make the public, the
press, or a single-issue interest group happy or not. They deserve as
much protection as we can give them, consistent with the other goals of
the judicial selection and re-selection process.
B.

Accountability: Judge John McBryde

The second goal of any judicial selection process is accountability.
Judges in our society have great power, but some people do not handle
power well. One familiar problem is the judge who succumbs to what is
commonly known as "robe-itis." Some people, once invested with the
power and prestige of judicial office, cease to feel constrained by simple
conventions of courtesy and civility. United States District Judge John
McBryde became a vivid example. 9 President George Bush appointed
Judge McBryde as a United States District Judge for the Northern
District of Texas. Judge McBryde quickly developed a reputation as a
judicial tyrant and eventually found himself the subject of a disciplinary
proceeding under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act.2 ° In the end
Judge McBryde was suspended from receiving any new cases for a period
of one year, he was disqualified from presiding over cases involving
twenty-three lawyer-witnesses against him for a period of three years,
and he was publicly reprimanded.2 '

19. In re United States Dist. Judge John McBryde, Under the Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980, Order and Public Reprimand (Judicial Council Fifth Judicial Circuit,
Dec. 31, 1997) (on file with the author).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 372 (2004). Judge McBryde is not the only judge to be disciplined for
abusive behavior. See Annotation,DisciplinaryAction Against Judge on Ground ofAbusive
or Intemperate Language or Conduct Toward Attorneys, Court Personnel,or Parties to or
Witnesses in Actions, and the Like, 89 A.L.R. 4th 278 (2004).

21. In re United States Dist. Judge John McBryde, Under the Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980, Order and Public Reprimand (Judicial Council, Fifth Judicial
Circuit, Dec. 31, 1997) (on file with the author). Judge McBryde challenged his
punishment in court. By the time his case reached the United States Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit, the disqualifications were moot. The court upheld the reprimand.
McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the Judicial
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Just viewing a sample of Judge McBryde's actions shows that he is the
best example of a judge who behaved as if he was not accountable to
anyone. In one episode Judge McBryde sanctioned an attorney for not
bringing her client to a court-ordered settlement conference.22 Under
the circumstances, a sanction was not surprising or troublesome, but
Judge McBryde chose to sanction in a particularly demeaning way:
Ms. Saulsberry: Your Honor, I thought that we were complying with
the spirit of the order in trying toThe Court: What did you think that meant?
Ms. Saulsberry: It meant that everybody should be present, Your
Honor. At the same time that I read it, though I,The Court: Did you have a hard time understanding it?
Ms. Saulsberry: No, sir.
The Court: I recently had this problem, and the lawyers ended up
taking a reading comprehension course.
Ms. Saulsberry: Yes, sir.
The Court: And I think we are going to do that again.
Ms. Saulsberry: Yes, sir.
The Court: So you are ordered to attend 15 hours of a reading
comprehension
course, and I want-well, we'll enter a formal order on
23
that.
When the lawyer submitted an affidavit of compliance, Judge McBryde
required her to submit a detailed supplemental affidavit, including the
provision of the name of someone who could verify her attendance.24
Poor Ms. Saulsberry was not the only lawyer who suffered the wrath
of Judge McBryde. A Public Defender left the courthouse for lunch while
a jury was deliberating because the Judge's law clerk had told him that
the jury had taken a lunch break. In fact the jury had not done so, and
it was ready to return a verdict while the lawyer was away. Because of
the delay in being able to accept the verdict, Judge McBryde issued an
order that no member of the Public Defender's Office could leave the
fourth floor of the courthouse while a jury was deliberating, including for
a lunch break or recess. 2' An Assistant United States Attorney was

Council of the United States, 264 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 821
(2002).
22. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL COUNCIL
REGARDING COMPLAINTS AGAINST, AND THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE CONDUCT OF, JUDGE

JOHN MCBRYDE, in McBryde v. Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability
Orders of the Judicial Conference of the United States, No. 00-5016, app. v.5, at 1391 (D.C.
Cir. Dec. 31, 1997).
23. Id. at 3214-15.
24. Id. at 3215-16.
25. Id. at 3219-23.
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held in contempt of court when he was unable to set up a conference call
at the time directed by the Judge, due to problems his office was having
with its long-distance provider.26 That lawyer described the Judge's
demeanor during this incident as "very vicious." 27 Another lawyer was

incarcerated by Judge McBryde for refusing to answer a question that
the lawyer in good faith thought might call for waiver of the attorneyclient privilege.2"
Judge McBryde did not confine his abuse to lawyers. An attorney had
the misfortune of being in trial in a state court at the same time he had
a pretrial conference scheduled in another case with Judge McBryde.
The state judge called Judge McBryde but did not receive the courtesy
of a return call. When the state judge personally went to Judge
McBryde's chambers to assure him that the lawyer really was in trial at
the state courthouse, Judge McBryde refused to see him and instead
sent out a law clerk with the message, "you are not welcome here and
you are to leave."29 In another episode, in response to a teasing
comment by a fellow federal judge about his impatience, Judge McBryde
responded, "I don't need that kind of crap from you." 0 Another time
at a meeting of the judges on court security, Judge McBryde told two of
the judges that they were "despicable" because a suggestion had been
should meet periodically to discuss matters of
made that the judges
31
mutual interest.
The sad saga of John McBryde demonstrates why no one, especially a
judge who has such extensive power in the lives of lawyers, court
personnel, and parties, can be totally unaccountable for their actions.
Most people who become judges will conduct themselves with dignity and
civility because they are the type of people who know what is appropriate. For the few who will let the power of judicial office go to their
heads, some mechanism must be in place to persuade them to behave
appropriately out of fear of sanction or, as a last resort, to punish them
for abuse of their office. No system of judicial selection or re-selection
can ignore the question of accountability.
C. Quality: Chief JusticeRoy Moore
It would seem obvious that any system of selecting judges would have
as a primary goal the selection of people with the right temperament

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

3244-48.
3247.
3248-52.
3253-58.
3294-96.
3296-97.

2005]

JUDICIAL PROFESSIONALISM

921

and good judgment to do this difficult job well and with compassion. 2
The system should attract the best candidates, or at least not deter them
from applying. It would subject candidates (or applicants) to a process
that would separate them and choose the best among them based on the
merits of their experience and personal and professional qualities.
Electing judges is at best an imperfect, and indeed sometimes dangerous,
way of obtaining quality on the bench. Roy Moore is an example.
Roy Moore was elected in 2000 as Chief Justice of Alabama. The best
appellate judges satisfy six criteria: (1) scholarly ability and interest in
the law; (2) ability to function comfortably in a semimonastic setting; (3)
good writing ability; (4) cooperative temperament; (5) broad experience
in life; and (6) wisdom and common sense.33 A system of selecting
appellate judges would take these criteria into account. Roy Moore
found another route to office. Moore has a colorful history, including
service in Vietnam, a stint as a professional kickboxer, and time spent
on a cattle ranch in Australia.3 4 He made himself famous as the trial
judge who placed a carving of the Ten Commandments behind his bench
and successfully fought a lawsuit by the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") to make him take it down. That fame enabled him to win his
seat as Chief Justice. He campaigned for his seat as the "Ten Commandments Judge" and pledged to put the Ten Commandments in the
Judicial Building.35 Among his other campaign statements were,
"'There is an absolute truth, and the truth is in the Bible. It represents
the truth upon which this nation was founded and is the basis of the
One newspaper account of the campaign
laws of our nation.' 36
described his appeal to the voters in this way:
"We call it the Bubba vote," said Brad Owen, an Alabama lobbyist.
(Bubba is Southern speak for "the average Joe.") "No matter how much
Bubba likes to drink and cuss and get in trouble, he still prays before
a stand.
he eats and puts God first. And he likes a man who makes
37
There's no doubt which way Bubba's going on this one."

32. For a description of the characteristics of good judgment in judging, see Anthony
T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835 (1987).
33. DANIEL JOHN MEADOR & JORDANA SIMONE BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 94-97 (West 1994). For an extended attempt to judge one appellate judge
by these criteria, see Patrick Emery Longan, Professionalismon the Appellate Bench: The
Life and Career of Justice George Rose Smith of the Arkansas Supreme Court, 55 ARK. L.
REV. 523 (2001).
34. For background reading on Roy Moore, see Jeffrey Gettleman, Judgment Day is at
Hand in Alabama, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2000, at El.
35. Associated Press, Judge Answers to Higher Court, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20, 2000, at N8.
36. Id.
37. Gettleman, supra note 34.
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The voters got what they wanted; however, what they wanted had
nothing to do with qualification for judicial office.3"
There were consequences from the voters' decision. In late August of
2003, Chief Justice Roy Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court was
suspended for defying a federal court order to remove a granite
monument, known as Roy's Rock, from the Alabama Judicial Building.
The Ten Commandments were etched into the rock. The building was
closed to the public, and its steps became the site of an around-the-clock
combination political protest and Christian revival that was intended to
protect the monument and prevent its removal. Roy Moore had placed
the monument in the Alabama Judicial Building in the dead of night,
without consulting his colleagues on the court.
The controversy
eventually led to Moore's removal from the bench.39
The consequences of the election of Roy Moore were more dramatic
and notorious than most judicial elections, but anytime a judge becomes
a judge for any reason other than merit, justice suffers, perhaps quietly.
The function of judges is not to represent the political preferences, much
less the religious preferences, of the electorate. Judges are in office to
decide cases impartially under the law, regardless of the popularity of
the law or parties involved. The selection of people like Roy Moore is
one result of having judges popularly elected. The voters may not
understand, or care, what it is that judges really do, or at least are
supposed to do. Voters may be so blinded by single issues such as the
Ten Commandments, or the death penalty, or gay marriage, or abortion,
or gun control, that they fail to appreciate that they are choosing a judge
not just for one case, or one type of case, but for all cases. They may
choose a Roy Moore when they need a Harry Blackmun, who was not
and never would have been elected to any public office. "Bubba" may not
care about quality, but he should.
III.

PART TWO:

THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF JUDICIAL SELECTION
AND POTENTIAL RESPONSES

Judicial selection and re-selection should seek to promote quality and
Most states
a balance between accountability and independence.

38. Roy Moore is of course not the only example of someone becoming a judge for
reasons other than merit. For other examples in another context, see DENNIS J.
HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE 287-309 (The Free Press 1998)
(describing the political considerations that led to the appointment of some federal judges
during the Kennedy Administration).
39. Moore v. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n of Ala., 2004 Ala. LEXIS 312, *1-14, *36-37 (Ala.
Apr. 30, 2004).
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continue to use some form of elections for judges, and these systems
have been in place for some time. Calls for reform have been common,
but recent events may make the need for reform more pressing. The
reforms themselves may be fairly mild, they may bring about more
fundamental changes to elections, or they may result in the abolition of
judicial elections.
A.

Recent Events

The United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit have rendered decisions that have
limited the ability of the states to regulate judicial campaigns.4" The
Judicial Qualifications Commission and the Georgia Supreme Court have
instituted reforms in response to these decisions.
1. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
In 1996 Gregory Wersal ran for a seat on the Minnesota Supreme
Court. In his campaign literature, he took issue with several decisions
of that court.4 ' One held that courts must suppress some unrecorded
confessions to police. Wersal's brochure asked, "'Should we conclude
that because the Supreme Court does not trust police, it allows confessed
criminals to go free?' 42 A second opinion struck down a state welfare
law. Wersal's literature argued, "'The Court should have deferred to the
It's the Legislature which should set our spending
Legislature.
43
Concerning an abortion case, Wersal wrote that the opinion
policies."'
was "'directly contrary to the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court,'" was
"'unprecedented,"' and was a "'pro-abortion stance.'""
A complaint was filed against Wersal, alleging that these statements
violated Minnesota's "announce clause," which stated that a "candidate
for judicial office, including an incumbent judge, shall not: with respect
to cases, controversies or issues likely to come before the court, make
pledges or promises that are inconsistent with the impartial performance
of the adjudicative duties of the office." 4 ' Although the Minnesota
authorities did not sanction Wersal for violation of the announce clause,
he withdrew from the race. He ran again for the Minnesota Supreme

40.
41.
White,
42.
43.
44.
45.

See, e.g., Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
This description of Wersal's statements comes from Justice Ginsburg's dissent in
536 U.S. at 811 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2004).
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Court in 1998 and unsuccessfully sought an advisory opinion from the
Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board that it would not
enforce the announce clause against him. When the Board declined to
give that opinion, Wersal filed an action in federal court for a declaration
that the announce clause violates the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. That question eventually made its way to the
United States Supreme Court.46
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the announce clause was
Justice Scalia began the majority opinion by
unconstitutional.4 7
dealing with a potentially significant oddity of the Minnesota Code of
Judicial Conduct. The announce clause was a vestige of an older version
of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.4 Because of concerns that
the announce clause might be unconstitutional, the ABA replaced it with
a "commitment clause," which prohibits judicial candidates from making
"statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect
to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the
court."49 A closely related type of provision is a "pledges or promises"
clause that forbids candidates from making any pledges or promises
While an
other than the faithful performance of their duties.i °
announcement of a position raises some concerns about a judge's
impartiality when that issue comes before the court, a commitment, or
a pledge or a promise, to decide an issue in a particular way is even
more troublesome. A failure to live up to that commitment, like a failure
to fulfill any other campaign promise, is a risky course for any elected
official who wants to remain in office. Because Minnesota's pledges or
promises clause was not at issue, Justice Scalia was able to begin his
opinion by putting it aside as something on which the Court was
expressing no view.51
The majority opinion analyzes the First Amendment challenge to the
announce clause using a "strict scrutiny" analysis, under which any
challenged state law must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.5 2 The interests alleged to be served by the announce
clause were impartiality of the judiciary, a due process concern, and
preservation of public confidence in the judiciary by maintenance of the

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

White, 536 U.S. at 768-69.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 768.
ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000).
See White, 536 U.S. at 770.
Id.
Id. at 774.
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appearance of impartiality. 53 Justice Scalia went to great lengths to
parse what "impartiality" might mean in this context. He disposed of
two possible definitions with little trouble. Justice Scalia first rejected
the notion of impartiality between the parties as a justification for the
announce clause, noting that the clause is not narrowly tailored to serve
that interest because it deals only with announcements about issues, not
parties.54 The Court next rejected the justification that the announce
clause was constitutional because it serves the interest of ensuring that
the judge is impartial between different views of the law.5 Justice
Scalia concludes that this is not a compelling state interest because a
"judge's lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a
case has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice"
because all judges, at least those who are qualified to hold judicial office,
are learned in the law and, therefore, have opinions about legal
issues.56
The third definition of "impartiality" proved more difficult to deal
with. That is impartiality as "openmindedness," the willingness to be
persuaded.5" A judge who cannot be persuaded, no matter how good
the legal argument, may violate due process by deciding a case based
upon preconceived ideas rather than the specifics of the particular case.
That same judge would impair the perception of the public about the
fairness of the system because, although justice is supposed to be blind,
it is not widely assumed to be deaf as well. These are the reasons
behind the commitment clause-to prevent judges from being so locked
into a position by campaign promises that they cannot open their minds
to a contrary view. Justice Scalia's task was to show that the announce
clause, a milder way of trying to keep judges free to decide cases on their
merits rather than on the basis of what was said on the campaign trail,
failed strict scrutiny.
Scalia did so by concluding that Minnesota did not adopt the announce
clause for this purpose.5" He noted a disconnection between openmindedness as a purpose for the announce clause and the limited reach of the
clause. 9 Because the prohibition on announcements reached only
campaign announcements and not those made in judicial opinions or
writings or speeches outside the campaign context, the announce clause

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

775.
775-77.
778.
777-78.
778.
775-81.
779-80.
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was "so woefully underinclusive as to render belief in that purpose
[openmindedness] a challenge to the credulous." ° To the argument
that campaign announcements, as opposed to announcements in other
contexts, posed a particular threat, Justice Scalia responded that the
Minnesota version of the commitment clause is there for that purpose
and is not an issue in this case.61 He also questioned whether a
campaign announcement was a particular threat and concluded by
stating that "[i]n any event, it suffices to say that respondents have not
carried the burden imposed by our strict scrutiny test to establish this
proposition (that campaign statements are uniquely destructive of openmindedness) on which the validity of the announce clause rests."6 2
Having dispatched the last of the alleged compelling state interests,
Justice Scalia concluded that the announce clause was unconstitutional.63
Two additional opinions are particularly worthy of note. Justice
O'Connor joined the majority opinion but wrote separately to state that
the practice of electing judges is what undermines the state's interest in
an impartial judiciary and in a judiciary that appears to be impartial.6 4
She noted the inevitability of an elected judge considering the political
consequences of a decision and the necessity of raising substantial funds
for campaigns, with the accompanying risk of favoritism or the
appearance of favoritism.6 5 Justice O'Connor briefly traced the history
of judicial elections in the United States and then concluded:
Minnesota has chosen to select its judges through contested popular
elections instead of through an appointment system or a combined
appointment and retention election system along the lines of the
Missouri Plan. In doing so the State has voluntarily taken on the risks
to judicial bias described above. As a result, the State's claim that it
needs to significantly restrict judges' speech in order to protect judicial
impartiality is particularly troubling. If the State has a problem with
judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by
continuing the practice of popularly electing judges.'
Justice O'Connor thus presented the states with a stark choice between
highly politicized elections and other forms ofjudicial selection processes.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 780.
Id.
Id. at 781.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 788-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Justice Ginsburg's dissent is also important. She argued that because
judges serve a different function than other office-holders, the state may
design a different election process for judges. 67 Justice Ginsburg
supported this argument by going to great lengths to show why the
commitment clause was constitutional. According to Justice Ginsburg,
it would violate due process for a judge to decide a case in which his or
her personal interests, here the interest in remaining in office by
fulfilling a campaign promise, were so central to the outcome.6" She
then contended that without the announce clause the commitment clause
would be easily circumvented. 9 It is not far from, "I will decide this
issue this way" to "I believe the issue should be decided this way."
Justice Ginsburg concluded that the announce clause was just as
important to due process as the commitment clause and was, therefore,
constitutional.7"
Republican Partyof Minnesota v. White clarifies some issues but raises
others. Candidates are clearly allowed to announce their positions on
disputed political or legal issues. The announce clause, however, is not
directly an issue for most states. Most have replaced it with commitment clauses, which were not at issue in White. Justice Ginsburg's
dissent focused on the constitutional support for that kind of clause.7 "
Justice Scalia disclaimed any attempt to "assert [or] imply that the First
Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as
those for legislative office."7" As the next case demonstrates, however,
the White case can be read to remove most differences between
campaigns for judicial office and other political campaigns.
2. Weaver v. Bonner
In a 1996 race for the Georgia Supreme Court, attorney George
Weaver sought to unseat incumbent Leah Sears.73 Weaver produced
a brochure that stated that Justice Sears: (1) "'would require the State
to license same-sex marriages;"' (2) "'ha[d] referred to traditional moral
standards as "pathetic and disgraceful;""' and (3) "'ha[d] called the
electric chair "silly."'" 74 At the time of this election, the Georgia Code

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 804-05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 805, 813 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 819 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 819-21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 803-21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 783.
Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1316.
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of Judicial Conduct7 5 stated that candidates for any judicial office that
is filled by public election between competing candidates
shall not use or participate in the use of any form of public communication which the candidate knows or reasonably should know is false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or which contains a material
misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the
communication considered as a whole not materially misleading or
which is likely to create an unjustified expectation about the results a
candidate can achieve.76
The Judicial Qualifications Commission received several complaints
about Weaver's brochure and, in accordance with its procedures at the
time, 77 referred the complaints to its Special Committee. The Committee concluded that Weaver's brochure violated the canon and issued a
confidential cease and desist request. Weaver responded with a second
brochure and a series of television advertisements that repeated many
of the same charges. The Special Committee released a public statement
that Weaver was engaging in unethical campaign practices and had
Six days later, Weaver
violated a confidential cease and desist request.
78
was defeated by Justice Sears at the polls.
Weaver sued in federal court and challenged the restrictions on his
speech as a violation of the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit examined Canon 7(B)(1)(d) ° and applied a strict scrutiny
It concluded that the Georgia provision did not give
analysis.8 '
sufficient "'breathing space'" to political speech and invalidated the
canon."2 The court went on to hold that the most a state could do to
regulate a judicial candidate's "'truth'" in speech would be to say that
the candidate may not make statements that are false with knowledge
reckless disregard of their falsity-an "'actual
of their falsity or8 with
3
malice standard.'
One part of the decision in Weaver that may prove to be particularly
troublesome involves the commitment clause and its first cousin, the
pledges or promises clause. As noted, the Supreme Court in Republican

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(d) (2004).
Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1315 (citing GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(d)).
This is referring to Judicial Qualifications Commission Rule 27.
Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1316-17.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(d).
Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1319.
Id. at 1317-19.
Id. at 1319.
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Partyof Minnesota v. White disclaimed any intent to pass on the validity
of the Minnesota pledges or promises clause.8 4 The Eleventh Circuit,
in Weaver, went further.8 5 The court responded to the argument that
speech in judicial elections was entitled to less protection than speech in
other types of political races by flatly stating, "we disagree." 6 The
court went on to state that "we believe that the Supreme Court's decision
in White suggests that the standard for judicial elections should be the
same as the standard for legislative and executive elections.""7 If that
is so, then the commitment clause and the pledges or promises clause
are as dead as the announce clause. Candidates for executive or
legislative office routinely promise what they will do in office about
particular issues. Voters expect them to do so and hold them accountable if they renege. If judicial races are no different, then we can expect
judges to be allowed to tell the voters how they will decide particular
issues and to seek their votes on that basis. Commitment will be
permissible, and it will come to be expected. Those who resist will lose.
Confidence in the courts as a forum for a fair hearing will dissipate as
the third branch is seen simply as another political branch subject to the
passions of the moment.
The Eleventh Circuit also reached out to invalidate restrictions on the
solicitation of campaign contributions and endorsements. The Georgia
Code of Judicial Conduct prohibited candidates from doing either
directly, but others, such as the members of a campaign committee,
could do so on behalf of the candidate.88 The Eleventh Circuit held that
these prohibitions violated the First Amendment:
Canon 7(B)(2) also fails strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly
tailored to serve Georgia's compelling interest in judicial impartiality.
Canon 7(B)(2) prohibits judicial candidates from personally soliciting
campaign contributions and from personally soliciting publicly stated
support, but allows the candidate's election committee to engage in
these activities. In effect, candidates are completely chilled from
speaking to potential contributors and endorsers about their potential
contributions and endorsements .... Successful candidates will feel
beholden to the people who helped them get elected regardless of who
did the soliciting of support. Canon 7(B)(2) thus fails strict scrutiny
because it completely chills a candidate's speech on these topics while
hardly advancing the state's interest in judicial impartiality at all.88

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

536 U.S. at 770.
Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1321.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1322-23.
Id.
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The running joke after Weaver was whether it would be best for the
judge to solicit contributions from lawyers before oral argument, after
oral argument, or perhaps even during oral argument (in order to get a
bidding war going). The consequences of Weaver, however, are no
laughing matter. Judicial elections in Georgia, and at least elsewhere
in the Eleventh Circuit, will never be the same.
3. The Response of the Judicial Qualifications Commission and the
Georgia Supreme Court
The Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission ("JQC") and the
Georgia Supreme Court had little choice but to revise the Code and
procedures under which judicial elections would be held in the future.
The court left Georgia's commitment clause in place for now, but in
commentary made it clear that under Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, a candidate is free to announce his personal views on issues. 90
The commentary, however, urges candidates to make it clear that judges
have the duty to follow the law even if it does not conform to the judge's
personal views." To follow Weaver, the canon about truth in campaigning was changed to state that a candidate "shall not use or participate
in the publication of a false statement of fact concerning themselves or
their candidacies, or concerning any opposing candidate or candidacy,
with knowledge of the statement's falsity or with reckless disregard for
the statement's truth or falsity."92 Weaver also required the court to
permit personal solicitations of campaign contributions and endorsements, but the court added commentary that urges judges and other
candidates to use campaign committees for these purposes to avoid the
appearance of impropriety.93 The procedures of the JQC for handling

90. The court's order making these changes is available at http://www2.state.ga.us/
Courts/Supreme/amended-rules/jqc_%207_27_or.htm.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. The relevant Canon and new commentary read as follows:
(2) Candidates*, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled
by public election* between competing candidates, may personally solicit campaign
contributions and publicly stated support. Candidates, including incumbent judges,
should not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the private benefit
of themselves or members of their families.
Commentary:
Although judges and judicial candidates are free to personally solicit campaign
contributions and publicly stated support, see Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312
(11th Cir. 2002), they are encouraged to establish campaign committees of
responsible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for their
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complaints during campaigns were also changed. In addition to the
application of the new standard, the JQC will no longer publicize a
candidate's failure to abide by a confidential cease and desist request.
Instead, the JQC will permit either party to release that information.94
The canons and rules now governing elections in Georgia conform to the
law as it exists today. Campaign speech and fund raising are now
subject to much less regulation than before.
B. Alternative Responses to These Changes
The landscape for judicial elections has changed. The question
remains what, if anything, should be done about those changes. The
possibilities include a variety of measures to improve the election of
judges or changing the selection process to eliminate elections.95
1. Improving Judicial Elections: Part I

Electing judges at the state level is a deeply-ingrained part of the
political process in most states. 96 Abolishing judicial elections, or even
reforming them in any significant way, may prove to be unwise or
politically impossible. There are improvements, however, that can be
made to the process without fundamentally changing it.

campaignsand to obtain public statements of support of their candidacies.The use
ofcampaign committees is encouraged because they may better maintaincampaign
decorum and reduce campaign activity that may cause requests for recusal or the
appearanceof partisanshipwith respect to issues or the parties which require
recusal.

94. Id. The new JQC Rule states in relevant part:
(5) if it is determined after the papers from the parties are reviewed that the
allegations do warrant intervention, the Committee is authorized:
(A) to immediately release to the complaining party and the person and/or
organization complained against, a non-confidential "Public Statement" setting out
violations believed to exist; and/or
(B) to refer the matter to the full Commission for such action as may be
appropriate under the applicable rules.
95. An excellent source on these proposals is COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY
JUDICIARY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY (2003).

96. For a state-by-state survey of judicial selection methods, visit the web site of the
American Judicature Society, at www.ajs.org.
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a. Voter Guides
The empirical work on voter awareness about judicial candidates is not
comforting. 97 Voters know very little about such "down-ballot" races,
and what they think they know may not be correct. In Dallas County,
Texas, one criminal court judge enjoyed the best name recognition of any
candidate. The reason for the recognition had nothing to do with his
performance or his campaign. He just happened to have the same name
as the most popular disk jockey on local morning radio.9" When voters
"decide" who to vote for in a judicial race, all too often they know far too
little about who or what they are voting for.
One remedy for this deficiency is the publication of voter guides and
other information to help educate the electorate.99 For example, voter
guides have been made available in California, Washington, and other
The most recent innovations have come from North Carolina,
states.'
where printed voter guides were mailed to every household in the state
at taxpayer expense for the 2004 elections.' 0 ' These voter guides
permitted candidates to provide information called for by a template.
Among the items sought were educational background, experience, and
a personal statement. 1 2 In other words, the candidates control the
content, but the voter guide has a consistent format for easy comparison
of candidates. North Carolina also has a web site where this information is available, and candidates are also permitted to record a short
statement that can be "webcast" to interested voters.'0° The League
of Women Voters of North Carolina has taken the "webeast" notion even
further. It broadcasts live a candidate forum and then archives the
forum for those who want to access it at a later time.0 4

97. See Anthony Champagne, Voter Awareness of Texas Judges (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
98. Id. at 9.
99. See JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supranote 95, at 78-79 (urging states to provide voter
guides).
100. The California League of Women Voters maintains a web-based voter guide. An
example of the voter information available about a candidate for the California Supreme
Court is availableat http'//www.smartvoter.org/2002/11/05/ca/state/vote/werdegar_k/. The
Washington Voter Guide is posted by the office of the Secretary of State of Washington, at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/guide/judicial.aspx.
101. The North Carolina Judicial Voter Guide is availableat http://www.sboe.state.nc.
us/pdf/Judicial%20Voter%20Guide%202004%2GGenElect.pdf.
102. Id.
103. See a candidate's web page and video statement, at http://www.ncvotered.com/
voter-guide/hunter.html.
104. See the webcast, at http://www.beforeyouvote.us/.
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It is important not to overstate the direct effect of the voter guides and
simlar educational efforts. Although creating and maintaining a web
site with this information is obviously much cheaper than trying to put
a hard copy into the hands of every voter, one must wonder how much
difference it makes. A voter who is so informed and motivated that he
visits a web site to gather information about the candidates is a voter
who probably is or would otherwise become well-informed anyway.
Unless we are going to start having the secretaries of state send "spain"
to every computer user in the state, web-based voter guides will not
reach a high percentage of voters. Where there are sufficient resources
to mail voter information, there is more comfort that it will reach voters
who would not otherwise receive it. Yet there is no conclusive proof
that, at least directly, the voter guides greatly improve the voters'
decision-making.
It is just as important, however, not to neglect the potential indirect
effect of the voter education efforts. Even if voters do not personally
peruse them, others do, and those others may convey the information in
a broader forum. For example, an influential local newspaper might use
the voter guides as a basis for a comparison of the candidates or even an
endorsement. If that is so, then people who never read or even knew
about the voter guides would be influenced by them, albeit indirectly.
As long as voters elect judges, it is better to try to inform them than to
accept their ignorance and apathy. Difficult decisions must be made
about expense and "bang for the buck," but some type of voter education
undoubtedly is better than no type of voter education.
b. PrivateMonitoring of Elections
Another way to improve judicial elections is the creation of private,
independent, "blue-ribbon panels" of high-profile, highly credible
individuals to monitor judicial elections. A governmental body like the
Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission cannot regulate campaign
speech that is merely erroneous, in part because the best remedy for
incorrect political speech is more speech. A blue-ribbon panel could
supply the additional, responsive speech. For example, if a candidate for
a state supreme court seat unfairly distorts an incumbent's record, the
panel would decide whether to respond. If it believed that intervention
was necessary, it would call a press conference, have one of its members
write an op-ed piece for the newspapers, or engage in other such
activities. Such speech would not have the imprimatur of government
regulation, but it could be used more swiftly and, therefore, effectively
precisely because of that. The effectiveness of the speech would depend
upon the quality and credibility of the people involved.
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Although mandatory state bar associations, like the State Bar of
Georgia, cannot act in this capacity because of their quasi-governmental
status, voluntary local bar associations can fill the void. In recent years
the American Bar Association ("ABA") has encouraged similar activity
when a judge is unfairly criticized, whether during an election or not.
In a videotape and a widely-distributed pamphlet, the ABA encouraged
local bar associations to have in place an action plan for responding to
unfair criticism of judges.' °5 Although this particular ABA body
suggested that one time a bar association might choose not to respond
would be during an election, that is precisely when a response is most
necessary, both because that is when the criticism is most likely to occur
and that is when the judge is most vulnerable. Time will tell whether
these bar associations or "blue-ribbon" panels can command enough
attention and have enough credibility to counteract unfair tactics by
judicial candidates, but this measure is undoubtedly constitutional and
has
well worth the effort. The National Center for State Courts
10 6
published a "how-to" guide for the creation of such committees.
Georgia undertook such an effort in the 2004 election cycle. Bill Ide,
a former President of the ABA, organized the Georgia Committee for
Ethical Judicial Campaigns ("Committee") in the wake of the decisions
in White and Weaver. Early in the campaign, the Committee asked
candidates for judicial office to sign pledges that they would voluntarily
conform their campaign conduct to the "old" rules. The Committee found
that few candidates were willing to make such a pledge."0 7 The
Committee also stood by, ready to speak out publicly if a candidate
engaged in inappropriate campaign tactics. Later in the election cycle,
in a run-off for an open seat on the court of appeals, the Committee did
publicly speak out. An advertisement for candidate Howard Mead
described his opponents, former prosecutors who had gone into private
practice, as "'high-priced criminal defense lawyers [who] work for the
kind of people they once sent to jail.'"'0 8 Another ad claimed that the

105. JUDICIAL DIVISION LAWYERS CONFERENCE AND SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RESPONSE TO CRITICISM OF JUDGES (1998).

106. The guide is available at http://www.judicialcampaignconduct.org/Handbook%20
Final.pdf. See also Roy Schotland & Barbara Reed, Judicial Campaign Conduct
Committees, 35 IND. L. REV. 781 (2002); JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 95, at 80-81
(urging bar associations and other organizations to establish voluntary guidelines for
judicial campaign conduct).
107. Steven H. Pollak, ChristianCoalitionTests JudicialCandidates,FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., May 14, 2004, at 1, available at www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=10843160
26302.
108. Jonathan Ringel, Mudslinging Judicial Campaign Draws Ethics Complaint,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Nov. 1, 2004, at 1, available at www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?
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opponents were "'working to keep drunk drivers, drug dealers and child
molesters out of jail.'" 109 The Ide Committee issued a statement
condemning the ads and called them "'misleading and inaccurate."'' "
It would be facile to state that the Committee's statement made the
difference, but, when the final votes were cast, Howard Mead lost to one
of the candidates he disparaged.'
c. Reduction of the "Arms Race" of Campaign Contributions
The amount of money flowing into judicial campaigns has increased
greatly in recent years. The escalation was predictable. Once a group
such as plaintiffs' lawyers decides to make large contributions to judicial
candidates in an attempt to "capture" the judiciary, any opposing group
must respond or face the consequences. Large contributions from one
side beget larger ones from the opposing side, and campaign spending
can spiral upwards. One solution to this "arms race" is to try to bring
opposing sides together to agree to limit campaign contributions. Both
sides are better off if they can conserve resources that otherwise would
be spent merely to cancel out the effects of contributions made to the
opposing side. Private efforts to bring the chamber of commerce and the
plaintiff's bar together, and to enforce any agreements that might follow,
pressure to raise and spend money on
would reduce the ever-increasing
12
judicial campaigns.
2. Improving Judicial Elections: Part If
If relatively mild efforts such as voter guides, private policing of
elections, and private arrangements to reduce the "arms race" of
contributions are not enough, then stronger reforms may be necessary.
There are ways to try to ensure quality, independence, and accountability, while continuing to elect judges-reform of the judicial selection and
These reforms include judicial nominating
re-selection processes.
quality
and longer terms and public financing to
ensure
to
commissions
Some measure of accountability might be
protect independence.

id=1098907065069.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Doug Gross, Bernes Wins Appeals Court Runoff in Light Turnout, MACON
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 23,2004, at 1B,availableat http://www.macon.com/mld/macon/10257340
.htm?template'contentModules/printstory.jsp.
112. See JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 95, at 79.
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achieved with a system that monitored judicial performance and that
allowed for more frequent discipline of judges.
a. How Judges Get to the Bench: Ensuring Quality Through Judicial
Nominating Commissions
One way to achieve a high quality bench is to make sure that only
high quality people become judges. Even in states that elect judges,
most judges first take the bench by appointment to an interim vacancy.
The most common method for filling judicial vacancies is by gubernatorial appointment." 3 Although one could hope that governors would
make these appointments on the basis of merit, history shows that some
are inevitably based upon political connections or political service. A
primary way in which many states seek to constrain the governor's
power to do anything other than appoint judges on the basis of merit is
by limiting the governor's choices through the use ofjudicial nominating
structure and in
commissions. These commissions vary widely in their
14
appointees.
potential
of
pool
the
over
power
their
More than twenty states have one state-wide commission, while others
have state-wide commissions for appellate seats and local commissions
for trial courts. Membership on the commissions vary, but a common
method for staffing the commission is to give powers of appointment to
the governor, the state bar, legislative leaders, and other prominent
leaders. The more dispersed the power of appointment is, the more one
can expect truly independent recommendations. For example, three
members of the Alaska Judicial Nominating Council are appointed by
the governor, three are appointed by the state bar, and the chief justice
serves as the seventh member."' In contrast the Georgia Judicial
Nominating Commission, first created by then-Governor Jimmy Carter
thirty years ago, is entirely a creature of the governor, and its members
serve at the pleasure of the governor. In a system like Alaska's, with
power dispersed, it is hard to imagine that purely political considerations could dominate over questions of merit. Concentrated power to
appoint the commission, as in Georgia, empowers the governor to allow
other factors to predominate.

113. See, e.g., John W. Reed, Judicial Selection in Michigan-Time For a Change?, 75
MICH. B.J. 900 (1996) (almost half of sitting judges in Michigan reached the bench initially
by gubernatorial appointment even though Michigan has an elected judiciary).
114. The information in this section summarizes state-by-state information that is
available on the web site of the American Judicature Society, at http://www.ajs.org.
115. For more information, see the web site of the Alaska Judicial Council, at
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/.
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Another important way in which the commissions vary is whether
their recommendations are binding. For example, in Georgia, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and North Dakota, the governor is under no duty to
appoint from the list of approved candidates. Former Georgia Governor
Roy Barnes famously ignored his own nominating commission in making
one appointment." 6 In over twenty-five other states, however, the
governor is bound to appoint one of the individuals approved by the
nominating commission. The power to limit the pool of potential
applicants is crucial to the ability of a judicial nominating commission
to ensure the quality of the eventual appointee.
Judicial nominating commissions address the issue of quality on the
bench. Judicial appointments, like all governmental appointments,
inevitably will have a political aspect to them. However, political
connections and contributions have little if anything to do with a
person's ability to serve with distinction as a judge. An independent
nominating commission with the power to make binding recommendations can screen candidates on the basis of qualities that will matter,
such as education, experience, and temperament. Merit matters, and it
Perhaps ironically, governors might prefer to have the
should.
insulation of a nominating commission to avoid the political pressure
that might be applied to appoint a well-connected but unqualified
individual."' Any system of judicial selection that has quality as a
primary goal should include some form of a truly independent and
powerful judicial nominating commission.
b. How Elections are Conducted: Protecting Independence by
Insulating Judges From Some PoliticalPressure
Elections threaten judicial independence by forcing judges to keep one
eye on the electorate while they make decisions and by making judges
beholden to lawyers and others who fund increasingly expensive political
campaigns. Two ways in which states can seek to minimize the threat
are to make judicial terms longer and to provide public financing for
judicial elections. Another is by making the campaigns less political in
the traditional sense by making them non-partisan or by using retention
elections in which the voters are asked merely whether the judge should
be retained.

116. Trisha Renaud, Reynolds ParlaysHard Work, Ties Into Quick Rise Up Ladder,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Aug. 30, 2000, at 1.
117. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 38, at 287-309 (describing how the need for ABA
endorsement was used to try to prevent the appointment of mediocre judicial candidates).
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(1) Longer Terms. Regardless of the format for elections, one
change that would improve judicial independence would be an acrossthe-board increase in the length of judicial terms. Short terms require
judges to face voters more frequently, which not only increases the
chances that political pressures may affect the judge's decisions but also
increases the need of the judge to raise money for campaigns. Both
consequences make judges less independent. Longer terms give judges
more of a record to run on and makes it less likely that an election will
occur soon after a particularly controversial ruling. Terms of office for
judges in the United States vary tremendously.11 For those who want
some judicial accountability but also want a measure of independence,
longer terms are better than shorter terms.
Public Financing. Another significant reform of judicial
(2)
elections would be public financing of campaigns. In states where
Weaver governs, judges can personally raise campaign funds, even in the
courthouse itself. Most voters believe that campaign contributions affect
judicial decisions. 1 9 Campaign contributions should not affect decisions because that is a form of corruption. Even if the campaign
contributions do not actually affect the decisions made by the judges,
they have the real potential to make it appear so. The appearance of
judges being bought and paid for is almost as destructive to the system
as its actuality. Public financing of judicial races would be a way to get
the money out of the courts.
North Carolina recently instituted public financing for appellate races
for precisely these reasons.1 20 Under the North Carolina system,
candidates for the court of appeals or the supreme court can opt for
public campaign financing. To qualify they must accept limits on raising
and spending campaign contributions in the primary election. They
must also raise a certain amount of money from a large number of North
Carolina citizens before the primary, and they must agree to spend only
the money provided by the public financing in the general election. The
money comes from a "check-off' system in the collection of state bar fees

118. A summary of the length of terms for judges, at http://www.ajs.org/js/Selection
RetentionTerms.pdf.
119. See Cathy R. Silak & Aaron C. Charrier, The Future of Judicial Elections: A
Campaign Conduct Proposal, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 357, 373 (2003) (quoting Lori DiCaire &
Tom Watson, Tipping the Scales: How Money Threatensthe Independence of Idaho's Courts,
published by Idahoans for Fair Elections, at http://www.idahoansforfairelections.org/
TIPPING%20THE%20SCALES%20report.pdf.
120. NC Judges Org., The JudicialCampaignReform Act, at http://www.ncjudges.org/
citizens/education/about-jcra/bill-info.php.
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and state income tax. 21 North Carolina's experience bears close
observation. If its public financing succeeds, then its new system may
be an example that other states can follow.
(3) Retention, or Non-Partisan, Elections. Changing the nature
of the elections is another kind of reform that states can employ to try
to de-politicize the process. At one extreme are states like Texas where
judges are elected in contested, partisan political races, as candidates of
particular political parties. One step removed from such races are those
that are contested but that are not partisan. For example, in Georgia
judges are elected in non-partisan races. North Carolina recently made
appellate races non-partisan.122 The hope is that judges will be elected
or not on their own merits and not as a consequence of the support of a
political party for which the voter merely "pulls the lever" in a straightticket vote. 23 The non-partisan election also attempts to remove the
judge one step from the hot-button issues of the day, the ones that are
most likely to divide the political parties.
Another step away from customary political races are those for
retention of a judicial seat. In a retention election, the judge has no
opponent. The ballot merely asks the voter to agree or not agree with
the proposition that the judge shall be retained in office. The ABA has
supported retention elections, such as the so-called Missouri Plan for
merit selection of judges, for many years. As Penny White's example
makes clear, the retention election does not remove the judge entirely
from political scrutiny, but it does make the judicial race look quite
different to the voter and, for all practical purposes, ensures that a
sitting judge will continue in office if there is no significant public
controversy about the judge's performance.
c. Alternative Mechanisms for Achieving Accountability
As discussed above, one
(1) Commission Recommendations.
proposal for the improvement of judicial elections is the creation and
dissemination of voter guides about judicial candidates. These guides

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. The effects of partisan political judicial races can be seen starkly in the 2004
election in Dallas County, Texas. For many years Dallas County has been a Republican
stronghold and consistently elected Republican judges. As demographics have changed, the
hold of the Republican Party on the county has weakened considerably. Three Republican
judges lost their seats in 2004 in an election in which straight-ticket Democratic voting
increased in Dallas County by 10,000. See Terri Langford & Sherri Jacobson, Dallas
County Gives Democrats a Reason to Smile, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 4, 2004, at 24A.
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can come from private groups such as the League of Women Voters or
the state secretary of state's office, but most of them merely provide a
The
questionnaire or a template for the candidate to complete.
organization controls the format, the candidate controls the content, and,
the hope is, the voter makes a more informed choice.
There is a stronger version of this technique. In Colorado the Judicial
Performance Commission ("Commission") and its local counterparts are
government agencies that have, as one of their purposes, the evaluation
of the performance of incumbent judges.' 24 Colorado uses a retention
system in which judges stand for re-election without an opponent, and
the Commissions provide information to help voters decide whether to
vote yes or no on retention. The Commissions do so through an
elaborate process that includes surveys of lawyers, parties, and others
who are familiar with the judge's performance. The Commissions also
interview the judges themselves. The Commissions then make a
detailed report, complete with a bottom-line recommendation of whether
or not the voters should retain a particular judge. 2 '
The criteria used by the Commissions include integrity, communication skills, control over judicial proceedings, prompt case disposition,
sentencing practices, preparation, attentiveness, docket management,
punctuality, administrative skills, legal ability, and knowledge and
understanding of substantive, procedural, and evidentiary law. 2 s The
Commissions also investigate whether the judge is courteous, treats all
parties who appear in the courtroom equally, displays a sense of justice,
provides clear written and oral decisions, displays appropriate demeanor
and displays compassion.' 2 ' The Commissions gather information by
randomly sending a number of questionnaires to lawyers, litigants,
jurors, victims, law enforcement personnel, social service caseworkers,
probation officers, court personnel, and deputy sheriffs assigned to the
courts. The Commissions use these questionnaires, along with a selfevaluation by the judge, oral interviews with participants in the system,
a variety
an interview with the judge, direct courtroom observation, and
28
of statistics to make their evaluation and recommendation.'

124. The information in this paragraph comes from the web site of the Colorado
Judicial Commissions on Performance, at http://www.courts.state.co.us/panda/judicialperfor
mance/judperfindex.htm.
125. Id.
126. The information in this paragraph comes from the web site of the Colorado
Judicial Branch, at http://www.courts.state.co.us/panda/judicialperformance/jpfacts.htm.
Alaska also makes recommendations regarding retention, available at http://www.ajc.state
.ak.us/Retention/retent.htm.
127. At http://www.courts.state.co.us/panda/judicialperformance/Jpfacts.htm.
128. At http://www.courts.state.co.us/panda/judicialperformance/jpfacts.htm.
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Not every judge receives a favorable recommendation. For example,
Judge Joel Thompson received a "do not retain" recommendation as part
of the 2002 election cycle.12 The performance report on Judge Thompson stated in part:
In survey results, Judge Thompson received consistently low ratings on
the issue of courtesy to parties, witnesses or attorneys. For example,
statewide 65% of attorneys and 68% of non-attorneys gave district
court judges an "A" rating on courtesy to parties or witnesses. Judge
Thompson received an "A" rating from only 28% of attorneys and only
38% of non-attorneys. Several responses describe him as arrogant, rude
or inconsiderate and question the judge's judicial temperament. During
his interview, Judge Thompson indicated that he is not intentionally
discourteous to litigants and witnesses although this may be the
perception. However, he acknowledged that he fully intends to be
critical of attorneys when their 13work is not in compliance with the
Rules of Procedure or his orders.
This report makes Judge Thompson sound like a junior John McBryde.
This "stronger" version of a voter's guide might, with sufficient publicity,
help to keep such judges accountable or, if they are not, return them to
private practice.
(2) Discipline. Another way to ensure accountability without
relying solely on elections would be to use the judicial disciplinary
system. For example, in Georgia judges may be disciplined or removed
from office for "(1) willful misconduct in office, (2) willful and persistent
failure to perform duties, (3) habitual intemperance, (4) conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial
office into disrepute, and (5) disability seriously interfering with the
performance of duties, which is, or is likely to become, of a permanent
character." 3 ' The hope is that the voters will not have to do the
difficult job of getting rid of bad judges. The appropriate disciplinary
agency could do the job for them.
Experience gives us reason to pause about relying too much on this
proposal. First, most referrals would have to come from lawyers, who
are understandably reluctant to make complaints about judges. Even
rules of professional conduct that mandate reporting of judicial

129.

Co. Bar Ass'n, HonorableJoel S. Thompson-14th JudicialDist.-DistrictJudge-

Not Be Retained, at http://www.cobar.org/group/display.cfin?GenID=1867.
130. Id.
131. See the web site of the Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission, at http://www.
georgiacourts.org/agencies/jqc/Pages/fp.htm.
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13 2
misbehavior are unlikely to stir very many lawyers to action.
Second, judicial disciplinary bodies may not have the resources to act
except under the most egregious circumstances. In Georgia three judges
have been removed from office in the last ten years as a result of the
133
It is impossible
efforts of the Judicial Qualifications Commission.
Georgia judges
because
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number
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to know, of course, whether
than fight
rather
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Georgia
One variation on the use of discipline to keep judges in line is the
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Georgia Judicial District Professionalism Program.
professional
a
judge's
with
a
problem
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program, lawyers
behavior, such as incivility, consistent lack of preparation, or failure to
follow uniform rules, may make a confidential report. The end result of
the report may be that a local member of the board of governors and the
designated "judicial advisor" for that circuit may have a private
conversation with the judge in an attempt to convince the judge to
behave better. The hope is that problems with judicial behavior can be
caught and cured more quickly and effectively in this non-coercive way
than through formal procedures. The program is keeping statistical
records on its use, and these records may enable the bench and bar to
of judicial discipline is
decide whether this "peer-pressure" version
36
effective in keeping judges accountable.

3. Replacing JudicialElections
Judicial elections are imperfect and, in light of recent developments,
are likely to become more so. Voters may be uninformed or unfairly
motivated by their disagreement with a particular decision of the judge.
The judges themselves have to make decisions under the constant strain

132. Georgia tacitly recognized this reality when it adopted its version of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. Georgia's Rule 8.3 provides that lawyers "should" report
when they know that a judge has violated a rule of judicial conduct "that raises a
substantial question as to that judge's fitness for office," availableat http://www.gabar.org/
grpc83.asp. There is, however, no penalty for failing to report.
133. See In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 275 Ga. 404, 566 S.E.2d 310 (2002); In re
Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 265 Ga. 843, 462 S.E.2d 728 (1995); In re Inquiry Concerning
a Judge, 265 Ga. 326, 454 S.E.2d 780 (1985).
134. See at http://www.georgiacourts.org/agencies/jqc/Pages/ms.html.
135. Complete description of the program, at http://www.gabar.org/jdpp.asp?Header'
jdpp.
136. Id.
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13
of knowing that they may lose their seats if they follow the law.
Money infiltrates the process in every election cycle and brings real and
apparent risks of bias. The process may well discourage many competent, honest lawyers from a judicial career. For these reasons and
others, there are many who would support a system that would do away
The most recent articulation of this
with the election of judges.
viewpoint comes from the ABA's Commission on the 21st Century
Judiciary. 3 ' This part of the report states:

The preferred system of state court judicial selection, a commissionbased appointive system, with the following components:
The governor should appoint judges from a pool of judicial aspirants
whose qualifications have been reviewed and approved by a credible,
neutral, non-partisan, diverse deliberative body or commission.
Judicial appointees should serve until a specified age. Judges so
appointed should not be subject to reselection processes, and should be
entitled to retirement benefits upon completion of judicial service.
Judges should not otherwise be subject to reselection, nonetheless
remain subject to regular judicial performance evaluations and
disciplinary processes that include removal for misconduct. 139
The Commission's report makes a series of secondary recommendations
for the improvement of judicial selection, but this method is the
Commission's preference.14 °
The ABA Commission thus took the view that judicial accountability
is not the primary goal of the selection and re-selection process. Rather,
the emphasis should be on using the nominating process to place only
highly qualified individuals on the bench and then giving them the
maximum job security in order to protect their independence.'
Accountability, if there is to be any, comes from the disciplinary process.
The recommendations represent a value judgment about the three goals
of judicial selection, although it must be said that it is a judgment made
based upon extraordinarily thorough work done by extremely informed
and capable people. The suggestions may be too strong for some because
they will encounter the political obstacles that surface any time someone

137. Hollywood provided perhaps the best example of this. In Miracle on 34th Street,
a trial judge in New York City had to decide whether a senior citizen who called himself
Kris Kringle was or was not the one and only true Santa Claus. His political advisor told
the judge that if he declared there was no Santa Claus, the judge would get exactly two
votes, "your own, and that district attorney's." The judge replied, "the District Attorney
is a Republican." MIRACLE ON 34TH STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1947).
138. JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 95, at app. A, at 4-10.
139. Id. at v-vi.
140. See id. at app. A, at 10-20.
141. Id.
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suggests taking away a voter's right to vote. To the extent that the
recommendations can be implemented, however, the results will bear
watching. In particular the ability of the disciplinary system to provide
sufficient accountability for judges who otherwise enjoy tenure will be an
interesting test.
IV.

PART THREE: A CONCLUDING THOUGHT ON A FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH TO REFORM

The need for accountability and the need for independence cannot be
reconciled. They can only be balanced against one another. Many states
strike different balances, and the various commissions and task forces
142
that have examined the issue in recent years have done likewise.
The most recent ABA Commission recommendations are at one extreme-favoring independence over accountability and protecting
appointed judges from any process that would hold them accountable for
their actions. States like Texas, where judges are elected in regular,
partisan elections, are at the other extreme. Because there are two
important but irreconcilable values at stake, the search should be for
some principled basis upon which to balance them.
One principled way to do this would be to recognize that the need for
accountability and the need for independence are different at the trial
court and the appellate court levels. Trial judges need to be more
accountable and have less, reason to fear inappropriate retribution in a
re-selection process. Appellate judges have much more to fear but
should need less accountability. Any system of judicial selection and reselection must recognize these differences and strike different balances
for these different types of judges. To understand why the two types of
judges should be treated differently, consider the following scenario.
Suppose that we are in a state that elects judges but permits the
governor to appoint judges to fill any unexpired terms. The governor

142.

See, e.g., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 95; COMMISSION ON STATE JUDICIAL

SELECTION STANDARDS, STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION (2000); OFFICE OF JUSTICE
JUDICIAL SELECTION (1998);
INITIATIVES, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ROAD MAP:
COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE FOR HIRE:

IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION (2002), available at http://www.ced.org/docs/report
/reportjudicial.pdf; JUDICIAL SELECTION TASK FORCE, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE SELECTION OF JUDGES AND THE

IMPROVEMENT OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN NEW YORK (2003), available at http://www.abc
ny.org/press/2003-10_28.htm; COMMISSION TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF

NEW YORK (2004), availableat http://law.fordham.edu/commission/judicialelections/images/
judfrepart.pdf.
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has vacancies to fill on the trial court and on the court of appeals. The
candidates for the trial court vacancy are likely to be lawyers who have
no judicial experience. They may be very good lawyers, but how they
react when they put on the robe is not completely predictable. The only
truly reliable predictor of judicial pcrformance is judicial performance.
A good lawyer who becomes a judge may become a wonderful judge,
efficient and firm, yet fair and compassionate. Or that judge might turn
into a John McBryde. Therefore, at the trial court level the unpredictability of a new judge's ability to handle the power of the office would be
an argument for more frequent accountability. Judges who soon become
afflicted with "robe-itis," whose doorways must be expanded to permit
their heads to make it through, may find themselves where they belong,
out of office. The fear of being booted out might also inoculate some
judges against the disease of arrogance, and it may make them better
judges than they might have been if they had been left merely to govern
themselves. It must also be noted that trial judges have much more
direct contact with the public and can, therefore, do much more damage
to the perception of the judiciary if they behave badly.
Judicial discipline is no substitute for some form of regular re-selection
of trial judges. Many of the problems with John McBryde would not
have amounted to misconduct that would have been serious enough to
warrant his removal from the bench for misconduct. He was rude,
arrogant, and insufferable, but he was not a criminal. The ABA
Commission recommendations may place too much faith in judicial
disciplinary processes as a method of accountability, at least for trial
judges. Too many judges who should not be judges would fly under the
radar screen of a disciplinary process designed to remove judges "for
cause" as defined by the ABA.
Appellate judges are a different matter. For one thing, appellate
judges live a much more monastic life and have less opportunity to be
provoked by, or to provoke, the public. Secondly, it is less likely that an
appellate judge would succumb to the temptation to become arrogant
and rude, at least if the candidates for an appellate position come from
the ranks of trial judges. Remember, the best predictor of judicial
performance is judicial performance. A trial judge who has allowed the
job to go to his head would not be a strong candidate for appointment to
an appellate court. On the other hand, trial judges who have proven
themselves capable of keeping both feet on the ground, despite judicial
office, are unlikely to turn into a John McBryde merely because they
move to the court of appeals. Because there is greater assurance that
the judge will not become insufferable, there is less need to design the
system to provide regular opportunities to deflate and remove the puffed-
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up judge. This is a good thing, because just as the need for accountability declines at the appellate level, the need for independence increases.
To see why this is so, continue with the scenario in which the governor
appoints a trial judge and an appellate judge to fill vacancies. Suppose
further that the trial court is a multi-judge court with, say, five judges.
Suppose further that the hot political issue is whether or not gay
marriage should be permitted, and the potential legal issue is whether
the state constitution is violated by laws that forbid gay marriage. A
lawsuit will be brought to challenge these laws. If it is brought in our
hypothetical trial court, the trial judge stands only a 20 percent chance
of even getting the case. If the case lands down the hall, in another
judge's chambers, our new trial judge can go about his day-to-day, lowprofile business far from the passions of the issue of the day. Even if the
trial judge must decide a highly controversial case, the decision will have
little immediate impact beyond the parties to the case. A trial judge
cannot bind other judges or other courts. The drama will simply move
on to the court of appeals, and the trial judge will soon be forgotten in
the rush upstairs.
The appellate judge has no such luxury. No matter how the challenge
to the law against gay marriage is decided by the trial court, the losing
party will appeal. Once the appeal lands on the new judge's desk, there
is no avoiding deciding it. And because decisions of appellate courts
have broader reach than decisions of individual trial judges, they make
for better copy in newspapers. The decision, which will seem outrageous
to one group or the other, will attract attention and might even lead to
an attempt to oust the appellate judge at the next available opportunity.
Even if the appellate court sits in panels, the loser with the panel is
certain to seek rehearing en banc. The appellate judge cannot escape
controversial issues. The appellate judge needs more protection from the
electorate or appointing authorities because of the greater likelihood of
having to make controversial decisions and the higher visibility that will
attach to any such decisions.
The implications of these observations are as follows. First, trial
judges should be subject to some form of regular re-selection. Their
terms, or at least their first term, should not be so long that they have
too much time to rule as petty little despots, if that is what they become.
Four years would be a good maximum term length. Incumbency is far
too powerful an advantage in a retention election if the purpose of the
election is to provide the public with a meaningful opportunity to oust
arrogant judges. The system should permit an outsider to challenge the
judge. There is no reason, however, to treat the re-election of a judge as
just another political campaign. Judges should not lose or keep their
offices because they belong to a particular party in a jurisdiction
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dominated by one party or the other. Non-partisan elections permit
challengers but avoid the contamination of judicial races by partisan,
party politics.
At the appellate level, longer terms and, at least, more insulated
means of re-selection are needed because of their greater need for
independence. That greater independence will be acceptable, particularly, if appellate judges are taken from the ranks of trial judges where
their ability to handle judicial office will have been tested. More
independence means more pressure somewhere in the system to protect
it against mistakes. Discipline will not suffice for the reasons already
stated. That pressure is transferred to the selection process. A judicial
nominating commission with the independence to cull out unqualified
candidates and the power to limit the appointment to only qualified
individuals will go a long way toward accomplishing that goal. A focus
on appointment to appellate courts of people who have already held
judicial office would also help ensure that it is safe to insulate the judge
from accountability. If the appointing authority will look to that pooi
when a seat comes open, then we can protect appellate judges from
hostile voters with greater confidence that we are not thereby harboring
a tyrant.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Mercer Symposium was an opportunity to explore the likely
consequences and possible responses to the decisions in Republican Party
The environment
of Minnesota v. White.4 and Weaver v. Bonner.'
in which judicial elections will be held in the future has been forever
changed. Campaigns for judicial office will bear more resemblance to
campaigns for executive and legislative office, likely including the
freedom to promise to decide issues in a certain way. Several types of
responses are available. States and private groups can try to improve
the climate of judicial elections without implementing any significant
reforms. Alternatively, states can continue to elect judges but change
the process in significant ways, such as by switching to retention
elections or by financing races with public funds. Finally, and most
drastically, states could respond to the new world ofjudicial elections by
no longer having them, by using a selection process that does not include
elections. The options are clear. It is our hope that this symposium will
have contributed positively to that ongoing, important debate.
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